

**UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE
MILANO**

**Dottorato di ricerca in
Modelli Quantitativi per la Politica Economica
ciclo: XXIII
S.S.D. : SECS-P/01; SECS-P/02; SECS-P/05**

*Institutions and Growth:
The Experience of the Former Soviet Union Economies*

Tesi di Dottorato di: Marta Spreafico
Matricola: 3610947

Anno Accademico 2009/2010



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Coordinatore: Chiar.mo Prof. Luigi Campiglio

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Executive Summary

Organized in three essays, this thesis aims at achieving a better understanding of the link between growth and institutions, and of the mechanisms through which the institutional arrangements affect the economic paths.

Exploiting the past common experience of the Former Soviet Union economies, this work provides an empirical framework to examine the impact on the economic performance of a set of institutions concretely related to the “functioning” of the economic activity and offers a first attempt to include in this research program the study of the consequences of the government actions.

The opening section introduces the main topics of the thesis and provides a brief description of the contents of the next chapters.

The first essay offers a thorough review of the literature researching on the link between economic growth and institutions, and elucidates several issues that deserve further attention; the second develops a static and a dynamic approach to assess, using multiple estimation techniques, the impact of a set of economic institutions on the growth paths of these countries; the third essay, through several formal specifications, deals with the relevant issue of the role of policy measures and of the effect of the political institutions on the governments behaviour.

The last section concludes outlining the meaning of our main findings and the new research challenges they inspire.

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