GEOPOLITICAL EFFECTS
OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION

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This dissertation is composed of three papers and discusses different aspects of the geopolitical organization of countries from a theoretical point of view.

In the first part, we develop an analysis on the effects of the distribution of incomes on size and public good provision in an international context. Heterogeneity concerns both the geographical space and the dimension of incomes. The utility of individuals depends upon their own location in the geographical space and their own income. In this chapter we refer to “median individual” in terms of “geographical location”; that is, the “median individual” is the individual living at the median distance between the center of the country and country borders. Both normative and positive solutions are considered.

The second paper studies the effects of wealth and income distribution on the willing to secede of regions within a democratic country. Heterogeneity concerns the dimension of incomes and individuals vote on the level of public spending. The utility of individuals depends upon their own income and it does not depend upon their own geographical location. Therefore, unlike the previous chapter, here we refer to “median individual” in terms of “income”; that is, the “median individual” is the individual with the median income.

In the last part of the dissertation, we focus on different indices used in the literature in order to rank income distributions. Our purpose is to analyze the relationships between the indices and we will also show the divergences in terms of policy implications on the basis of the measures used.
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